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SECURITY INFORMATION*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Assistant Director, National Estimates

DATE: 26 September 1952

25X1A9a FROM : [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Air Force Position on SIE-5

1. In case the Air Force raises any further issues on SIE-5 the following points may be of use:

a. Actually the long history of this paper has been largely one of prolonged efforts to meet numerous Air Force objections. The six month delay in reaching agreement, which involved three full-scale inter-agency sessions and over a dozen meetings, is due primarily to the Air Force position. At the first series of working level meetings we reached complete agreement (including Air Force), only to have Air Force override its working level and re-open the whole paper.

b. The other agencies, and O/NE in particular, have leaned over backwards in an effort to secure Air Force agreement. They have in dozens of cases reluctantly retreated from previously held positions solely to avoid Air Force dissent, and have accepted at least one hundred Air Force changes. They have now reached the limit of their concessions, and G-2, ONI, O/SI, and apparently JIG and State accept the paper as it stands.

c. We called in three eminent consultants to hear the arguments of all sides. They accepted the Air Force view in some cases and not in others. We stand on their judgment.

d. The fact that Air Force did not get all of its changes accepted in the last series of meetings was only to be expected, since most of these changes were the residue from previous meetings, and had been repeatedly rejected by the other agencies. Therefore, Air Force should not feel too unhappy, because it has in fact had the major agency role in framing the paper as it now stands. It should feel reasonably satisfied.

2. I believe that if Air Force clearly understands the above situation, it will be less disposed to raise hell.

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D/I, USAF Footnotes to SIE-5

1 October 1952

1. Reference page 2, par 4 a

The D/I, USAF considers this statement implies an extent of radar coverage greater than available evidence would indicate. It is known there exists considerable early warning coverage in western and far eastern sectors of the USSR, but intelligence data gives little indication as to whether or to what extent important areas in the central portion of the USSR may be provided with early warning coverage.

2. Reference page 4, par 4 b

The D/I, USAF considers this statement should be qualified by the comment that effective controlled interceptions at the speeds and altitudes stated would be possible only if the new Soviet GCI radars have performance capabilities approximately equal to the U.S. CPS-6 and if radar crews have achieved a high level of competence with the equipment. There is no evidence that the Soviet radars actually possess such capabilities, nor that training exercises at these speeds and altitudes ever have been attempted.

3. Reference page 3, par 4 c

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4. Reference page 5, par 6 b

The D/I, USAF estimates that substantial numbers of interceptors could become available by 1954, but considers it does not necessarily follow that "all-weather interception capabilities will almost certainly increase considerably" by that time. The numerous difficulties which are discussed in paragraph 42 are not reflected in the stated conclusion. As there is no evidence that either the aircraft or the airborne equipments have as yet become available, the time remaining in the period of this estimate is not considered sufficient to achieve the desired level of competence for the necessary technical and operating personnel.

5. Reference page 12, par 18

5. The D/I, USAF, considers that the "other indications" referred to in the last sentence of paragraph 18 are not sufficiently valid to be considered in this estimate, and that the one incident described does not constitute sufficient evidence to provide the basis for the conclusion that the USSR "... probably now has some type of AI equipment available for limited operational use."

6. Reference page 13, par 19

The D/I USAF considers that this estimate is not justified by the available evidence. The lack of AI equipment in operational interceptor units is believed to be demonstrated by the following:

a. The physical characteristics of the aircraft assigned to interceptor units do not indicate the probable installation of any interception equipment.

b. The tactics employed in Korea [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] are not indicative of interceptions assisted by airborne equipment.

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c. The continued use of searchlights in Korea and in the Soviet Union as an aid to intercepting² target aircraft.

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7. Reference page 16, par 27

The D/I, USAF considers that available evidence on Soviet progress in missile and guidance development would limit estimated maximum slant range to 25,000 yards.

8. Reference page 23, par 41

See footnotes on pages 3, 12, and 13.

9. Reference page 26, par 47

The D/I, USAF believes that the serious deficiencies listed are of a nature and magnitude to prevent an estimate that the air defenses are in an "advanced state of readiness."

10. Reference page 15, par 25 - Appendix B

The D/I, USAF desires to point out that:

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*D/I, USAF FOOTNOTE TO SIE #5

The Director of Intelligence, USAF is concerned by the several occasions in this estimate where meager evidence has been used to establish a judgment without, in his opinion, adequate consideration being given to substantial opposing evidence. He believes that the IAC opportunity to create intelligence of value in this subject area lies in developing better National intelligence on probable Soviet timing. To avoid an intelligence dilemma as well as a military one such intelligence should be based on a balance of evidence conceivably firm enough to warrant extreme National action. He believes that the occasions marked by asterisks in this estimate indicate a trend away from, rather than toward, this goal.

Directions Governing Placement of D/I, USAF Footnote and Other References Thereto Throughout SIE #5.

1. The above statement should be footnoted to the title.
2. All individual D/I, USAF footnotes appearing in the 6 Oct 52 draft of SIE #5 will be removed and the following substituted in each instance -- * see D/I, USAF footnote on page ____.
3. In addition, asterisks should be inserted after the first sentence in paragraph 37, page 25, of the discussion and after the last sentence (corrected version) in paragraph 25, page 16, Appendix B. Similar footnotes as indicated above should also be shown at these points.

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